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The founding and guiding principles for the establishment, operation and development 
of the Autonomous Bougainville Government 
(ABG) are contained in the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement. Insofar as they are concerned with 
political/constitutional/institutional reform, 
they represent an attempt to transform and 
channel previous, violent conflicts into 
political processes and institutions (Bachler 
n.d.; cf. Widner 2005 and Ghai 2004). They 
are, therefore, concerned with governance 
– the process by which society collectively 
attempts to solve problems, maintain public 
order and meet other shared needs – and not 
just government – one of the main instruments 
used for such purposes (Osborne and Gaebler 
1993:24; cf. Wolfers 2006a:4). This is made 
clear by the way in which the arrangements 
for Bougainville autonomy are embodied 
together as but one of three pillars in a much 
broader Agreement, concerned with autonomy, 
a guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s 
political future, and weapons disposal. In fact, 
the three pillars themselves are only part of 
an Agreement which also provides an amnesty 
for persons convicted and immunity from 
prosecution for offences committed during the 
Bougainville conflict, and a commitment by 
former combatant groups to disband and work 
through a unified set of administrative and 
political structures – the ABG. The broader 
concern with governance expressed in the 
attention the Agreement gives to weapons 
disposal, amnesty and reconciliation is given 
additional, clear expression in the provisions 
dealing with the referendum, which state 
that the timing of the referendum in the 5-
year window allowed, 10-15 years after the 
establishment of the ABG – that is, between 
2015 and 2020 – will be determined by reference 
to weapons disposal and good governance 
(in the case of the latter, defined with regard 
to internationally accepted standards as 
they are applicable and implemented in the 
circumstances of Bougainville and the rest of 
Papua New Guinea).
The circumstances in which the 
arrangements for Bougainville autonomy were 
agreed are underlined by the way in which the 
Papua New Guinea Constitution, Part XIV, as 
well as the organic law made under that part 
– which, together, give these arrangements 
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legal effect – were deliberately given a title 
which refers to more and other than formal 
governmental arrangements: ‘Peace-Building 
in Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville 
Government and Bougainville Referendum’. 
This was done at the insistence of the national 
minister responsible for negotiating the 
Agreement, Hon. Sir Moi Avei, and despite some 
misgivings among members of the Bougainville 
team who participated in finalizing the drafting 
of the constitutional laws giving legal effect to 
the Agreement. There were observers, as well 
as participants on the national government 
side, who, almost certainly, saw relevance and, 
perhaps, precedents being set for other parts 
of the country in elements of the autonomy 
arrangements being considered and agreed 
for Bougainville. However, the emphasis 
on ‘Peace-Building in Bougainville’ in the 
constitutional laws was intended to underline 
the point that the agenda of the discussions 
and the purpose of the arrangements being 
agreed was not primarily constitutional reform, 
improved service delivery, or anything else, 
but a determination to secure lasting peace by 
peaceful means. Their focus was specifically on 
peace building in the post-conflict situation 
in Bougainville, not on issues and political 
aspirations or possible claims in other parts of 
Papua New Guinea.
The result is that Papua New Guinea now 
has a system of government in which the 
arrangements that apply to different parts of 
the country are not uniform. Bougainville 
and, in other respects, the National Capital 
District are different from other provinces 
(for all that Bougainville now carries the 
name ‘Autonomous Region of Bougainville’, 
its boundaries continue to be defined in the 
Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries). While 
the particular arrangements are not identical 
with any previously envisaged, the resulting 
diversity in the arrangements which apply to 
the government of different parts of the country 
was originally foreseen in the Final Report of 
the pre-independence Constitutional Planning 
Committee, which recommended that 
provincial governments be established in three 
stages (Papua New Guinea 1974, Part 1:10/4). 
It is also broadly consistent with the purpose 
of the Papua New Guinea Constitution s187G, 
which allows for provincial governments to 
acquire functions and powers in stages, for a 
gradation of provincial governments, and for 
the establishment of provincial governments 
on an interim basis.
It was, in fact, for primarily managerial 
(not political) reasons that the ‘one size fits 
all’ approach was instituted when provincial 
governments were formally established in all 
provinces from 1977 on (even prior to the 
‘reforms’ introduced in 1995). There were, 
undoubtedly, good grounds for concluding that 
a uniform arrangement would be easier for 
the national government to manage than one 
which allowed for diversity (they do not include 
the quite widely held suspicion, sometimes 
bordering on fear, that, if arrangements varied 
between different parts of the country, people 
throughout Papua New Guinea would be so 
short-sighted, even blind to the implications, as 
to make or support demands which would give 
their particular province or region the greatest 
constitutionally available local control over the 
formal functions and powers of government: 
people in parts of the country where educated 
manpower is in short supply, incomes are low, 
and the revenue base is accordingly narrow 
are not all so ignorant or indifferent towards 
economic and other realities that they are 
likely to advocate or support changes which 
they must know, at least intuitively, will be to 
their disadvantage, or might even not work 
at all). In any event, Papua New Guinea now 
has an asymmetrical system of government: 
governmental arrangements are not the same 
in every part of the country. It is with the 
implications of this new reality, as well as the 
particular implications of the arrangements 
which now apply in Bougainville, that this 
paper is concerned.
Broadly conceived, the implications 
that Bougainville autonomy has for Papua 
New Guinea can be grouped under several 
headings. They are the implications the new 
arrangements have for:
(1) Bougainville, especially the ABG;
(2) the national government and Papua New 
Guinea as a whole, including relations 
with interested external actors who see 
themselves as having a stake in what has 
been agreed; and, specifically,
(3) the current form and future of 
decentralization.
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In regard to the referendum provisions, 
in particular, it might be relevant to note 
media reports of the apparently calm and 
orderly manner in which the outcome of the 
referendum in Montenegro on 21 May 2006 
has been accepted in Serbia and elsewhere – 
with a narrow majority of Montenegrin voters, 
just over 55 per cent of the absolute majority 
required to participate in the ballot for a valid 
result, in favour of a separate independence for 
Montenegro (see International Crisis Group 
(ICG) 2005 for background and ICG 2006 for 
the result). This is in contrast to the continued 
deferral of referenda in other parts of the world 
where they have been agreed, for example 
Western Sahara (for background, see Hodges 
1983), the violence which erupted in East 
Timor (requiring the presence of international 
peacekeepers) following the referendum of 
30 August 1999, and the manner in which 
other acts of self-determination have been 
conducted, for example, the Act of Free 
Choice in West New Guinea/Irian Jaya, now 
Indonesian Papua, in 1969. The relatively 
cordial, peaceful dismemberment of the former 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony into Kiribati 
and Tuvalu, which became independent in 
1976 and 1978 respectively, stands out – though 
the formal split occurred before independence, 
and, therefore, did not openly challenge the 
existing international order of sovereign states. 
So, too, do the plebiscites in Palau and other 
Micronesian states formed out of the former 
United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, previously administered by the United 
States of America, and the referendum in 
Tokelau in early 2006 (the effects of which have 
been to maintain the political status quo, and 
for Tokelau not to enter into free association 
with New Zealand – at least, not yet).
background and character of 
bougainville autonomy
The preamble to the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement describes the Agreement in the oft-
quoted phrase as ‘a joint creation’ of the parties 
which made it. The agreed arrangements for 
Bougainville autonomy are the product of 
protracted negotiation and compromise. While 
they draw on precedents and experience, both 
positive and negative, in other countries, in 
While the arrangements focus on 
government, their real importance is on the 
effects they have for governance more broadly 
defined. The ultimate test of their impact and 
effectiveness will be the referendum due to be 
held 10-15 years after the establishment of the 
ABG – now, perhaps, as little as nine years 
away – between 2015 and 2020. The ostensible 
issue – and the question which will be on the 
ballot-paper unless the ABG decides otherwise 
(in accordance with procedures set out in the 
Bougainville Constitution) – will be a separate 
independence for Bougainville. However, as 
the result of the referendum will be subject to 
the overriding decision-making authority of 
the National Parliament, the ultimate issue is, 
in fact, even bigger and likely to have much 
greater consequences – that is, whether people 
in Bougainville (and at the centre of national 
government and in other parts of the country) 
will accept both the result of the referendum 
and the outcome of the National Parliament’s 
deliberations on that result in an orderly and 
peaceful way. This will really depend on the 
degree to which such critical elements of good 
governance as acceptance of democracy and 
the rule of law have been achieved. Thus will 
the referendum be a test both for the ability of 
government to persuade people to support the 
maintenance of the unity and territorial integrity 
of Papua New Guinea – an objective and 
principle which many people in Bougainville 
share – and of the commitment, ability and 
effectiveness of the ABG and the national 
government to achieve good governance both 
in Bougainville and nationwide. The manner 
in which the constitutional laws implementing 
the Bougainville Peace Agreement have been 
entrenched – through a procedure, known 
as ‘double entrenchment’, which provides 
that they can be changed only if specified 
majorities in both the National Parliament and 
the Bougainville legislature, the ‘Bougainville 
House of Representatives’, agree – means not 
only that the provisions on autonomy and 
referendum are locked in together but so are the 
national government and the ABG: neither can 
change the arrangements previously agreed and 
now implemented in national constitutional 
laws unless the other agrees (the requirement 
is generally a two-thirds absolute majority vote 
in each, except in the case of the autonomy 
provisions, where only a simple majority is 
required in Bougainville). 
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Papua New Guinea before and following the 
1995 ‘reform’ of the provincial government 
system, and in Bougainville itself, they do 
not follow any one precedent or model. They 
are truly ‘home-grown’. They form part of a 
package, which also includes: a guaranteed 
referendum on Bougainville’s political future – 
with a separate independence for Bougainville 
an available option; a weapons disposal plan; 
amnesty for crisis-related activities; and a 
commitment by their leaders to disband former 
combatant groups. The various elements of the 
package are formally linked together – so that 
the coming into effect of the constitutional 
laws implementing the Agreement depended 
on progress with weapons disposal (verification 
and certification of stage 2 of a three-stage plan, 
verified and certified by the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Bougainville [UNOMB]), 
and the holding of the first general election for 
the ABG depended on its conclusion. Weapons 
disposal and good governance will both be 
issues in determining the precise timing of the 
guaranteed referendum. In this context, ‘good 
governance’ is defined in the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement, Paragraph 313 (a) so as to: 
take account of internationally accepted 
standards of good governance as they 
are applicable and implemented in 
the circumstances of Bougainville and 
Papua New Guinea. These benchmarks 
include democracy and opportunities 
for participation by Bougainvilleans, 
transparency, and accountability, as 
well as respect for human rights and the 
rule of law, including the Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea.
The national government and the ABG 
are committed to cooperate in working 
towards these benchmarks, and to use the Joint 
Supervisory Body and other agreed procedures 
for resolving disputes to determine whether 
Bougainville has reached the agreed standard. 
The timing and credibility of the conduct and 
result of the referendum will likely require 
ongoing consultation and cooperation between 
the national government and the ABG.
However, prior to the inclusion of links 
between different elements in the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement and implementing laws, 
they could already be found in the proposals 
the various parties brought to the table 
when negotiating the Agreement. Thus, the 
combination of a guaranteed referendum on 
a separate independence for Bougainville 
and autonomy made it possible for different 
Bougainville factions to come together and 
develop a joint negotiating position, and form a 
combined Bougainville delegation to pursue it. 
The assurance of amnesty was a precondition 
for former combatants to turn the words of 
the agreed weapons disposal plan into action. 
On the national government side, the linkage 
between weapons disposal and the other 
elements was critical to establishing the sense 
of mutual security which made it possible to 
finalize the Agreement. Other linkages, which 
were even more critical to acceptance of the 
overall package, were the agreements that the 
arrangements would come within the framework 
of the Papua New Guinea constitution (as 
amended to implement the Agreement), and 
that the outcome of the referendum would be 
subject to the final decision-making authority 
of the National Parliament.
Thus it is that the negotiations have been 
described as having multiple dimensions 
(Regan 2002) and layers (Wolfers 2006a:4) 
– in Bougainville, on the national government 
side – where successive governments have been 
committed to a bipartisan/national approach 
– and ‘across, the table’, so to say, between 
the combined Bougainville and national 
government delegations. The situation was 
often similar even as agreements were reached, 
when the parties found it necessary to negotiate 
and shore up or build coalitions on either 
side – for example, so that the Bougainville 
People’s Congress (BPC), the Bougainville 
Interim Provincial Government (BIPG) and 
the Leitana Council of Elders in Buka would 
cooperate and accept the same compromises; to 
facilitate the involvement of former elements 
of the Meekamui Defence Force in weapons 
disposal; for the BIPG to govern in consultation 
with the BPC through the Bougainville 
Transitional Consultative Council pending 
establishment of the ABG; and, on the national 
government side, to address and overcome the 
concerns of officials who, in reviewing the 
ABG constitution, expressed concern that the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing 
laws were themselves unconstitutional.
In this context, one of the strengths of 
the process has been simultaneously one of its 
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weaknesses. This has been the willingness of 
the parties to proceed in the knowledge that 
not all prospective stakeholders are involved, 
while continuing to welcome them to join in. 
Thus, peace-making and peace-building to date 
have kept moving ahead without the active 
participation of the hard core of the late Francis 
Ona’s closest supporters (in what has become 
known as the ‘No Go Zone’ around Panguna) 
without creating the opportunity which 
insistence on inclusiveness as a precondition 
for negotiation or final agreement might have 
created for them to become ‘spoilers’ (Wolfers 
2006b:9; cf. Stedman 2000).
As the following discussion of the 
implications of Bougainville autonomy 
will show, the circumstances in which the 
arrangements were negotiated not only 
influenced what was agreed but continue to be 
closely relevant to their ongoing implications.
implications for bougainville
The most obvious influence that the 
origins and purposes of Bougainville autonomy 
continue to have on its actual functioning 
is that the peace process and the area and 
population where the ABG operates do not 
cover the whole of Bougainville. While the 
ABG has made good progress in restoring 
services in the ‘No-Go Zone’ – and so in 
lowering or, at least, getting around the 
physical and psychological barriers which cut 
the area off from its surrounds – the ABG’s 
authority is also not Bougainville-wide. The 
situation has been further complicated by the 
arrival in 2005 and the subsequent presence of 
Noah Musingku (architect of the illegal fast-
money scheme, U-Vistract, and the self-styled 
Kingdom of Papala) and his associates in Siwai, 
and their efforts to cut off the area around Tonu 
and other parts of South Bougainville from the 
ABG and the rest of Bougainville.
The Bougainville conflict was, in many 
respects, a civil war among Bougainvilleans, 
especially after the withdrawal of government 
services in early 1990, as well as a conflict 
between the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA) and its allies, on the one hand, 
and the Papua New Guinea security forces, 
on the other hand (see Papua New Guinea 
1990 for a detailed analysis of the origins and 
development of the conflict). As the conflict 
spread around Bougainville, growing numbers 
of Bougainvilleans aligned themselves for 
or against secession/remaining part of Papua 
New Guinea on grounds of principle, personal 
identification as being primarily Bougainvillean 
or Papua New Guinean, or perceived personal 
or wider advantage. However, the ways in 
which many others acted owed more to local 
circumstances, including traditional enmities, 
rivalries or alliances: if a particular person, 
community or group went one way, then 
neighbours were all the more likely to go in 
another (see Spriggs 1990 for a graphic first-
hand account of the way in which the conflict 
spread in Central Bougainville). Fear and 
a desire to settle old scores were sometimes 
relevant. So was the desire for adventure, theft, 
or what has been described in other contexts 
of conflict as ‘plain old thuggery’ (King 
2001:166). Thus did the wider conflict divide 
families, communities and larger groups, and, 
in some cases, lead people who had previously 
identified themselves with the BRA or the 
Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF), after 
their formation in 1990, to change sides. The 
devastating impact this had on social capital 
or community has been documented both by 
research (Peacock-Taylor et al. 1999) and in the 
accounts of persons, especially women, directly 
affected by the conflict (Sirivi and Havani 
2004a, 2004b; Ninnes 2006; Wolfers 2005:170-
173 lists a variety of different sources). Thus 
reconciliation – creating a sense of community 
– is among the challenges the ABG faces, 
especially if Bougainville is to be a genuinely 
democratic society, where citizens respect one 
another, and not just a place where elections 
are held (cf. the discussion of the distinction 
between liberal and illiberal democracy in 
Zakaria (2003), and of the basis and character 
of democracy in Sharansky 2004). Another 
challenge is the growing ‘culture of claims’, 
so-called, in which individuals, businesses 
and groups seek financial redress for losses 
suffered, services rendered or support provided 
in return for promises made, both explicitly 
and by implication, during the conflict (these 
include former BRF combatants who fought 
or performed other services in support of the 
security forces). 
The enormous physical damage and 
destruction which occurred both to physical 
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infrastructure and to the economy, including 
agricultural production, especially following 
the withdrawal of the security forces and the 
subsequent collapse of government throughout 
Bougainville in early 1990, is a great challenge 
for the ABG too (see the description in Dorothy 
2000, Part 3:2 by former BRA Chief of Defence, 
Sam Kauona, of the ‘madness’ with which 
vehicles and other property were taken, and 
rendered useless). It is of particular relevance to 
the ABG’s capacity and political future because 
of the way in which the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement and implementing laws link national 
government grants to the ABG to restoration, 
and the taxation powers available to the ABG 
to the achievement of fiscal self-reliance. Much 
more importantly – and not at all surprisingly, 
given the role that perceived disadvantages 
and inequities played in the origins and 
development of the Bougainville crisis, 
including the ways in which they divided even 
families and communities (see, for example, 
Papua New Guinea 1990; Filer 1990) - these 
lingering effects of the previous conflict are a 
continuing source of pressure by constituents 
on the ABG. This pressure has immediate 
implications for the ABG’s popularity and 
credibility, the prospects for members’ election 
or re-election, and, ultimately, for the causes in 
which leaders and people believe, whether it be 
continuing autonomy, a separate independence 
for Bougainville, or some other arrangement. If 
the ABG cannot deliver at least a reasonable 
proportion of what Bougainvilleans want, 
then the prospects are that members will lose 
support; the ABG as a whole will fail to gain 
and might even lose credibility; people outside 
the peace process will continue not to join in 
– and might become an even stronger magnet 
for disappointed or dissident people inside; and 
pressure for a separate independence will grow 
(though the outcome might also do little to 
resolve the issues which lead people to vote in 
a particular way when the referendum is held).
A related consideration is that the way 
in which various political and former armed 
factions have come together – in a process 
which involved coalition-building through the 
Bougainville People’s Congress, the combined 
Bougainville delegation which participated 
in negotiations, and then the Bougainville 
Transitional Consultative Council – does 
not mean that previous preferred positions, 
alliances and differences have necessarily 
been left behind, or resolved with the formal 
establishment of the ABG. Not all differences 
have been resolved with the establishment 
of the ABG. Politics goes on (it might, in 
fact, be – to reverse von Clausewitz’s famous 
dictum – the pursuit of war by other means). 
Lobbying for particular policies and jockeying 
for position is likely to continue within the 
ABG. This can be seen in differences which 
have already emerged among Bougainville 
leaders over mining and other policies (Post-
Courier 3 July 2006:6), and the questioning by 
an ABG member as to why the Bougainville 
constitution does not make specific provision 
for an opposition (Post-Courier 28 June 
2006:14). The guarantee of a future referendum 
on Bougainville’s political future might, in 
fact, provide an incentive for the persistence 
of such differences, and even their growth. As 
the referendum approaches, the question of a 
separate independence for Bougainville might, 
therefore, become increasingly important, 
urgent, and central to politics in Bougainville 
– with those who were leaders or otherwise 
involved in previous arrangements providing 
convenient scapegoats for others, including 
those motivated by little other than populist 
politics or political advantage.
As part of the agreed autonomy 
arrangements, the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
and implementing laws vest quite substantial 
responsibility for government and development 
in Bougainville in the ABG. Additional 
functions and powers are available for transfer 
at the ABG’s request, provided the ABG has 
the capacity and resources required to manage 
them (if not, then the national government 
and the ABG are required to develop joint 
plans to facilitate implementation – and to 
resolve any dispute through the agreed dispute 
resolution procedures). The ABG also has 
the right to play or seek a role in respect of 
functions and powers in areas which remain 
primarily national government responsibilities, 
including specific aspects of defence, foreign 
relations, administration of the common 
border with Solomon Islands, maritime 
surveillance, immigration and others. This 
will, obviously, require additional human and 
other resources. So, too, does the planning 
required for restoration, development, and good 
governance, and the proper management of 
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produce certain tax figures in order to facilitate 
implementation of the agreed financial 
arrangements for Bougainville, the practical 
reality was that the IRC does not normally 
collect or classify certain information on a 
provincial basis or in ways that can be easily 
divided or aggregated to identify Bougainville-
specific activities and/or amounts (there has 
previously been neither need nor reason to do 
so). When it came to delegating certain police 
functions and powers to Bougainville, it was 
not more laws or regulations that were required 
but a method of implementing the delegations 
consistent with the way the Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary is organized and operates 
(and even the insignia and uniforms that police 
wear). This took many meetings between 
officials of the various agencies concerned with 
implementing the Bougainville Peace Agreement, 
and resulted in the decision that the position 
of police commander in Bougainville should 
be raised to the level of assistant commissioner 
(the time and effort were well spent in that 
the outcome has been successfully applied, and 
has needed neither external supervision nor 
review to achieve the intended objective). The 
principles underlying the various grants which 
the national government is legally obliged to 
make to the ABG are quite clearly expressed. 
But what is a ‘recurrent grant’ really expected 
to be or do: to be equal to funds previously 
provided for similar purposes (which are often 
less than actual costs – and require cross-
subsidization from funds intended for other 
purposes), or to be enough to meet real, overall 
costs; or to bring Bougainville up to a particular 
standard of service availability or delivery – 
pre-conflict or at the current national average? 
Should it be measured on a per capita or some 
other basis? 
In every case to date, the mutual goodwill 
has existed to find a way through – often by 
deferring final decisions and making mutually 
acceptable ad hoc arrangements (thereby 
avoiding disputes and possible resort to the 
courts), while matters of detail are worked 
out. But this cannot go on forever. The risk 
is that someone who objects or believes they 
are in some way disadvantaged could take to 
court one or more areas in which practical 
implementation falls short of the law, or make 
it a political issue. Fresh challenges of a similar 
kind could well arise when the ABG requests 
human resources, infrastructure and equipment, 
and public funds. 
Thus does autonomy have implications 
for the need not only for an enlarged public 
service but for personnel with much higher-
level policy and planning skills than provincial 
governments normally have at their disposal 
(or than the North Solomons and Bougainville 
Interim Provincial Governments probably 
required in the past). The implications for 
training and/or recruitment of persons with 
relevant skills seem clear, as do the associated 
costs. Then there are the costs in time 
and funds required for the various forms of 
consultation with the national government 
for which the agreed arrangements provide, 
including but not only the Joint Supervisory 
Body. These are additional to the costs of the 
political structure for which the Bougainville 
constitution provides, both the core elements 
already established and those which the ABG 
is authorized to establish as resources allow 
implications for the national 
government
The preceding comments concerning 
the costs of government and the acceptance 
or deflection to others of responsibility for 
what transpires in Bougainville, especially 
failures or delays in implementing the agreed 
arrangements for Bougainville autonomy or in 
promoting restoration and development more 
generally, have immediate implications for 
public perceptions of the national government’s 
commitment to Bougainville autonomy and 
the effectiveness of the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement.
It is one thing to formulate an agreement, 
and then to turn what has been agreed into 
law. But turning even what might be described 
as implementing laws into practical actions 
can present yet further challenges. This has, in 
fact, been the experience to date, despite the 
presence and participation of senior officials 
from relevant national government agencies in 
the negotiations which led to the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement and implementing laws, and 
the decision-making processes through which 
the National Executive Council gave its 
approval. Thus it was that, when the Internal 
Revenue Commission (IRC) was asked to 
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the transfer of functions or powers currently 
exercised on a regional or national basis, and 
it becomes necessary to provide the human 
and financial resources for the ABG to assume 
responsibility. The likelihood that ad hoc, 
band-aid approaches will be required is likely 
to increase, at least in the short and medium 
term, as the ABG gives notice of its desire to 
assume formal responsibility for an increasing 
number and range of government functions 
and powers. It will take continuing mutual 
confidence and commitment to cooperate in 
realizing the potential of the ‘joint creation’ 
outlined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement for 
the system to operate and develop as intended, 
and to avoid disputes.
On the national government side, the 
challenge of ensuring that government officers 
are aware of the relationship between their 
activities and the provisions in the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement is great (and made all the 
greater by rapid turnovers of staff, often for 
reasons as mundane as promotions, resignations, 
retirements and public sector restructuring). 
Relevant constitutional legislation alone covers 
some 146 pages, and then there is the main 
aid to interpretation, the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement, which is mandated by the Papua 
New Guinea constitution itself (s278(3)) and 
covers a further 73 (much smaller) pages. For 
officials (and others) needing to understand 
what might be termed ‘the Bougainville end’ of 
many issues, the documents they might need to 
consult include:
• those which apply as national law (just 
listed);
• the Constitution of the Autonomous Region 
of Bougainville (which covers 178 pages, 
including a number of annexes summarizing 
relevant provisions of national constitutional 
laws, plus 65 pages of legislation providing 
for the first general election for the ABG), 
which must be applied consistently with the 
Papua New Guinea constitution; 
• other Bougainville-made laws; as well as 
• a number of aids to constitutional 
interpretation, including the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (again), 
Notes to Figure 1
*  The autonomy provisions in the National Constitution, Part XIV and the Organic Law made under 
that Part can be amended  following 2 months notice, consultations between the National Government and 
the ABG, and approval by two-thirds absolute majority in the National Parliament in two separate votes at 
least one month apart and simple majority vote in the Bougainville legislature. 
** May be between 28-38 for future elections 
*** Subject to review before the end of the ABG’s first 5-year term (2010), and to cease, in any event, 
when the guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s political future is held in the period 2015-2020.
**** Chosen from the legislature.
The President chooses the Vice-President, who must come from a Region of Bougainville other than his own.
The Bougainville Constitution provides for the President to appoint an additional further 4 members of the 
Bougainville Executive Council when the Bougainville House of Representatives considers financial resources 
allow and a law is made for the purpose.
***** Offices and institutions established under the National Constitution which may be replaced / 
supplemented by Bougainville counterparts include: Auditor-General, Electoral Commissioner, Ombudsman 
Commission, Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor, Public Services Commission, and Salaries and 
Remuneration Commission.  Government services include Public Service, Police, and Correctional 
Institutional Services.
Figure 1 was originally prepared to accompany seminar on ‘Bougainville Autonomy – Implications for 
Governance and Decentralisation’ by Edward P. Wolfers, National Research Institute, Waigani, 22 June 2006
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the draft constitution and a 368-page 
report prepared by the Bougainville 
Constitutional Commission, the records 
of the Bougainville Constituent Assembly 
which formally adopted the Bougainville 
constitution, and a list of papers presented 
by the national government and accepted 
as aids to interpretation so that the draft 
could be finalized, formally adopted, and 
sent on to be endorsed by the National 
Executive Council and brought into force 
in accordance with its own provisions by 
the governor general. 
Training, both formal and on-the-
job, is required to ensure that relevant 
national government officials are aware of 
their responsibilities towards Bougainville. 
Procedures have to be developed, put in 
place, and then implemented to ensure 
that the national government’s ability to 
meet its responsibilities in and in relation 
to Bougainville is more systematic and less 
directly dependent on particular incumbents. 
Briefings are also necessary and procedures 
have to be put in place, too, in order to ensure 
that foreign aid donors and others understand 
how they should conduct their relations with 
the ABG (generally, through the Departments 
of National Planning, Foreign Affairs, and/
or other and relevant national government 
departments and agencies). 
In relation to restoration and development, 
Bougainvilleans – faced with the obvious 
damage, removal and destruction of 
infrastructure and equipment in Bougainville – 
rightly point to the problems and disadvantages 
they face. But the situation increasingly appears 
rather different to that of many other Papua 
New Guineans. Quite apart from statements 
which attempt to attribute blame for what has 
occurred, there is the reality that, on many 
indicators, Bougainville is, in fact, better off 
than many other parts of Papua New Guinea. 
After all, it is Bougainville that was awarded 
a prize for the best medical services in the 
country on the first anniversary of the ABG’s 
establishment. At 95 per cent, the proportion 
of the eligible school age population (7-12) 
that manages to enrol in Grades 1-6 is the 
most favourable in Papua New Guinea, while 
the proportion of secondary school enrolments 
is also among the highest (Gomez 2006:163). 
However, exhortations to recognize that 
perceived disadvantage and need should 
be viewed as against competing needs and 
aspirations in other communities are unlikely 
to mean much to people who have suffered the 
decline in living standards that is the reality 
of life in contemporary Bougainville – and, 
possibly, to be counter-productive for people 
who do not believe that Bougainville should 
remain in Papua New Guinea and, therefore, 
be viewed in national perspective.
For Papua New Guineans who believe 
that the country should remain together as 
one, winning the referendum is an important 
objective. It is important, in any event, to 
people who believe in equity, or fear that failure 
to devote sufficient resources to restoration 
and development in Bougainville could 
increase discontent and disaffection there. 
An impoverished and administratively weak 
Bougainville would be likely to become an area 
of vulnerability – and hence of concern for 
Papua New Guinea – whatever Bougainville’s 
political status. Thus it is that the national 
government faces the challenges not only of 
honouring the grants to the ABG which are 
required by law – the recurrent, restoration 
and development, and police grants – but 
of identifying, mobilizing and ensuring the 
allocation of resources to restore and develop 
services which remain national government 
responsibilities, and, perhaps, to engage in 
activities which will persuade Bougainvilleans 
of the advantages of remaining with Papua New 
Guinea. This is among the reasons why the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing 
laws provide for the national government to 
make additional, conditional grants (the ABG 
must agree; the grants cannot be imposed). 
It is also why peace-building (projects and 
support) is among the Bougainville Peace and 
Restoration Office’s priorities for 2006: the 
others are capacity-building and relationship-
building (with other government agencies, 
the ABG, foreign aid donors, non-government 
organizations and civil society) in order to 
support and facilitate implementation of the 
agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy 
and other objectives of the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement. 
Meanwhile, is it wise to expect (however 
much one might hope) that people who were 
willing to compromise their previous positions 
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for the sake of peace – and a combination of 
autonomy and a guaranteed referendum with 
a separate independence for Bougainville an 
available option – to abandon their old hopes 
and ambitions? Are they not at least as likely 
to see the period leading up to the referendum 
as providing a test of their previous beliefs, 
or an opportunity to promote them? In this 
regard, some of the accompaniments of the 
celebrations marking the first anniversary of 
the ABG on 15 June 2006 provide food for 
thought: the remark in the Handbook (ABG 
2006b:16) handed to visitors stating that ‘Over 
the past 12 months, Bougainville began on a 
thin road to full freedom and self determination 
…’; the art exhibition with a painting referring 
prominently to autonomy and independence 
at the highest point at the centre of the wall 
at the end of the display; and other physical 
objects and remarks. These observations are 
not occasions for criticism or dejection. Rather, 
they remind observers of the many challenges 
that remain or are likely to arise in future. 
The statements and paintings observed need 
to be put in broader perspective. Thus, the 
ABG’s Strategic Action Plan, prepared in 2005-
2006, contains a Foreword by the ABG vice-
president, Hon. Joseph Watawi, which says 
that:
Bougainville is an autonomous region 
within Papua New Guinea. It is NOT 
a province. As an autonomous region, 
Bougainville has the power to make 
decisions that will determine its own 
destiny. However, the autonomy 
arrangements are a joint creation with the 
Papua New Guinea National Government 
and therefore an effective and equal 
partnership with national Government is 
essential (ABG 2006a:2-3).
The Strategic Action Plan (ibid.:21) itself 
states that:
Even though Bougainville is an 
Autonomous region it remains part of 
Papua New Guinea and it is important 
that planning for Bougainville is 
consistent with planning at the National 
level.
To the degree that Papua New Guineans 
seriously wish the country to remain one 
– and preferably, by consent of the people 
– or can see the shared interest there is in 
ensuring a stable, orderly Bougainville, the 
statements just quoted above are challenges 
to be met, not left to resolve themselves or 
be ignored. The importance of meeting these 
challenges is made all the greater by what 
many Bougainvilleans regard as a history of 
promises not kept or deliberately broken in 
relation to decentralization and mining policy, 
in particular, since before Papua New Guinea 
became independent, and their role in giving 
rise to the conflict which engulfed most of 
Bougainville in the period 1989-1997.
Understanding will be required when 
politicians from Bougainville, like politicians 
elsewhere, engage in political grandstanding or 
try to shift responsibility for shortcomings and 
failures in public policy and implementation; if 
and when they give priority to overseas travel 
and foreign affairs, or become involved in 
controversial or risky financial or other deals; 
or otherwise give what critics and sceptics 
might regard as too much attention to activities 
other than restoration and development which 
benefit people at the grassroots, including 
(re-)integration of former combatants and 
communities. 
The ABG is intended to provide political 
avenues for the pursuit and resolution of 
political differences among Bougainvilleans, 
as previously discussed. The Joint Supervisory 
Body and other agreed procedures, including 
the courts, established or specified in the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing 
laws are intended to prevent and resolve 
inter-governmental and other disputes. The 
bottom-line assurance is that the national 
government on a bipartisan/national basis and 
Bougainvilleans on all sides say they are firmly 
committed to ‘lasting peace by peaceful means’, 
and have generally acted accordingly in the 
nine years since armed conflict ceased and the 
Burnham Truce was signed in 1997 (Dihm and 
Wolfers 1998).
Thus it is that the ‘joint creation’ embodied 
in the Bougainville Peace Agreement has become 
a joint venture, as the responsible minister 
(Hon. Sir Peter Barter) has repeatedly said 
– with the national government having a clear 
interest in cooperating to make autonomy 
work and produce results. The implications of 
the experiment with Bougainville autonomy 
for governance in Bougainville and nationally 
are accordingly clear.
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implications for decentralization
As the names of the Papua New Guinea 
constitution, Part XIV and the organic law 
made under that part are intended to convey, 
the arrangements for Bougainville autonomy 
have been agreed in order to make and build 
peace in Bougainville (not anything or 
anywhere else). This was the context in which 
they were made. The ‘one-off ’ character of 
the arrangements agreed for Bougainville was 
critical to the support they eventually received 
in the National Executive Council and in the 
National Parliament (where the bills to amend 
the Papua New Guinea constitution and make 
the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville 
passed with much greater support than the 
two-thirds absolute majority required, with 
no votes against and only a single amendment 
– to retain legal control over firearms for the 
national government). The names of the 
constitution, Part XIV and the Organic Law 
on Peace-Building in Bougainville – Autonomous 
Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum underline the point that these 
arrangements were not intended to be a new 
form or gradation of provincial government 
available for further application in Papua 
New Guinea as provided in the constitution 
at s187G. The new constitutional laws are 
purpose- and situation- specific arrangements 
made for the sake of peace.
Inevitably, however, there have been people 
who have speculated about the relevance and 
application of the agreed arrangements for 
Bougainville autonomy in other parts of the 
country (some participants in the negotiations 
had their eyes on other provinces, sometimes 
negatively and sometimes, perhaps, as 
providing a model or precedent too – though 
Bougainville leaders have tended to say that 
Bougainvilleans did not experience and suffer 
the conflict in order to open the way forward for 
people in other parts of Papua New Guinea, as 
they believe was the case when the provincial 
government system was first proposed before, 
and subsequently established soon after, Papua 
New Guinea became independent).
The East New Britain provincial 
government has been most active, having set 
up a high-level committee in 2002 to explore 
options for autonomy in East New Britain (the 
chairman was the member of parliament for 
Pomio, Hon. Paul Tientsen; one of the two 
deputies was Sir Paulias Matane, now governor 
general; other signatories of the committee’s 
Report (Community Consultative Committee 
on Provincial Autonomy 2004) included all 
members of parliament from East New Britain. 
The initiative was motivated partly by perceived 
shortcomings in the system established under 
the provincial government ‘reform’ since 1995, 
as well as greater autonomy as such. Lacking a 
clear response from the national government 
to the report, the East New Britain provincial 
government is now taking steps to promote 
public discussion. 
Meanwhile, the governor of Morobe, Hon. 
Luther Wenge, has also spoken out for greater 
provincial autonomy (which is not a new 
theme in Papua New Guinea politics; it has 
been around for at least thirty-plus years, since 
before independence; but it is not clear what 
is meant or implied when some of Governor 
Wenge’s supporters describe themselves as 
belonging to the ‘Republic of Morobe’). In early 
July 2006, the Morobe provincial government 
established a high-level committee to prepare 
detailed proposals, consistent with the Papua 
New Guinea constitution, before the 2007 
national general election. 
The West New Britain provincial 
government has been reported as being 
interested in greater autonomy too (Post-
Courier 5 July 2006:4). The East New Britain 
committee saw itself as charged 
to take the issue of provincial autonomy 
to the people and get their agreement to 
seek greater provincial autonomy for East 
New Britain (Community Consultative 
Committee on Provincial Autonomy 
2004:8).
Members saw their report as providing the 
basis for negotiation with, and decision by, the 
national government (it is clearly not intended 
to be a set of final demands).
The Report calls for the province to have its 
own constitution (a feature which is currently 
unique to the ABG, but applied to every 
provincial government in Papua New Guinea 
before the 1995 ‘reform’). The legislative and 
executive structures proposed are similar to 
those which currently apply to provincial 
governments around Papua New Guinea 
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(consisting mainly of members of parliament 
and presidents of local-level governments 
in the province), but not the ABG. The 
innovative features of the proposal are to be 
found elsewhere.
To begin with, the East New Britain 
proposals are concerned primarily with taxation 
and other revenue arrangements, and control 
over the public service. Though some of the 
language used in the East New Britain report 
seems to owe quite a deal to the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement, it does not refer to aspects of 
the Bougainville arrangements which might 
be regarded as specifically relevant to the post-
conflict situation there – such as the special 
provisions contained in the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement regarding police and the Defence 
Force as a result of experiences and perceptions 
during the Bougainville conflict. Their focus 
is on greater provincial control over sources of 
revenue, the budget, and public service. 
If every province had the control over 
sources of tax and the revenues they yield 
that the East New Britain proposals envisage, 
together with continuing, large national 
government grants, it is difficult to know how 
economic development could be planned or 
services could be provided on a national basis, 
or what resources would be left to meet the 
costs of the national government, let alone the 
range of grants sought – though the proposals 
recognize the need for the province to continue 
making what the Community Consultative 
Committee on Provincial Autonomy (2004: 
16) terms ‘a fair contribution to the National 
Government purse in accordance with a 
revenue sharing formula’. Establishing and 
operating a separate public service at provincial 
level would also be likely to weaken both the 
capacity and cohesion of public administration 
at the national level and nationwide. 
These recommendations and reservations 
serve to highlight the ongoing effects of some of 
the basic and pervasive features of the provincial 
government system since independence, both 
before and since the ‘reform’: dependence on 
national government funds and administrative 
resources (including foreign aid and technical 
assistance). The social, political and even 
the overall economic costs of collecting local 
government taxes before independence were 
among the reasons why the previous system in 
which local government councils relied heavily 
on locally-raised head taxes was changed 
(the issue was especially contentious on East 
New Britain’s Gazelle Peninsula). Another 
important reason was the reality that national 
government revenues, including foreign aid, 
were widely perceived as providing a sound 
fiscal basis for change. Having a separate public 
service in every province would be costly, 
with increased overheads (possibly including 
a separate Public Service Commission in each 
province, etc.) – albeit, arguably, with the 
possible advantage of increased responsiveness 
to local circumstances. It is in relation to these 
issues, in particular, that Bougainville should 
not be seen as a model or precedent to be 
followed in other parts of Papua New Guinea 
without the most careful consideration, and 
possible modification. 
As previously observed, indeed stressed, 
the national government did not intend that 
the agreed arrangements for Bougainville 
autonomy would open the way for other parts 
of the country, as the names of the constitution, 
Part XIV and the organic law both show. 
Moreover, Bougainville political leaders have 
been adamant that they do not wish to see a 
repeat of the pre-independence situation where 
the Bougainville Interim District Government 
and pressures for provincial government 
in Bougainville led the way for the rest of 
the country – with no obvious benefit for 
Bougainville, and an outcome in which the 
‘one size fits all’ approach which was adopted 
meant that other provincial governments 
sometimes acquired powers and functions 
they did not need, want or handle very well, 
while Bougainville was held back to a uniform 
standard.
conclusion
The agreed arrangements for Bougainville 
autonomy were made in the course of a complex 
set of multi-dimensional and multi-layered 
negotiations in a post-conflict situation where 
the main shared objective was to secure lasting 
peace by peaceful means. The compromises made 
on many particular aspects of what was agreed 
form part of a package in which the different 
elements are linked in a variety of ways. 
Autonomy is not a clearly defined 
concept (Lapidoth 1997:5; Hannum 1990; 
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Dinstein 1981). Autonomy arrangements 
around the world are of many different kinds 
– often classified into those which involve 
the devolution or acceptance of substantial 
authority under the control of institutions 
responsible for the government of the people 
and area encompassed by the autonomous 
entity (‘political autonomies’), and those where 
the issue is primarily cultural and/or linguistic 
identity (‘linguistic or cultural autonomies’). 
Owing its origins to the Greek term for ‘self-
government’, ‘autonomy’ is also used as a way 
of describing or measuring the relative power 
or control over public affairs of sub-national 
authorities (the term is used in this general 
way in the pre-independence Constitutional 
Planning Committee’s Final Report 1974, Part 
1:10/9). 
However, a little remarked feature of 
many political autonomies is that they are 
often essentially ad hoc, one-off arrangements. 
Thus it is not really accurate to describe 
Australia or the United States of America as 
federations – what of Norfolk Island and the 
Northern Territory in the first case, and of the 
Commonwealths of the Northern Mariana 
Islands and Puerto Rico in the second, not to 
mention the national capital territories (the 
Australian Capital Territory and the District of 
Columbia respectively)? The United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 
New Zealand are not really unitary states when 
the Channel Islands in the first case, and Cook 
Islands and Niue in the second case are taken 
into account. And so on around the world. 
In this regard, the essence – and the truly 
innovative aspect – of Bougainville autonomy 
lies in the (so far) successful compromise it 
represents as a means of providing an agreed 
arrangement to make and build peace by 
peaceful means, and recognition that ‘one size 
does not always fit all’ – that realities in Papua 
New Guinea may require a certain measure 
of asymmetry (which is also evident in other 
ways), and that Bougainville is ‘one off ’ for 
the sake of peace. The Papua New Guinea 
constitution, the Bougainville Peace Agreement, 
and the Bougainville constitution are all 
‘home-grown’ (that is, made in Papua New 
Guinea by Papua New Guineans to suit Papua 
New Guinean conditions). It might, therefore, 
be appropriate to conclude by reflecting on 
the origins of the provincial government 
system before independence. The issue then 
was not just service delivery (though this was 
clearly relevant), or responsiveness to local 
circumstances (which was relevant too), but 
conflict prevention and resolution – directed 
towards addressing pressures in East New 
Britain and Bougainville, in particular, without 
yielding to the threats that growing regional 
identity in Papua and the Highlands were 
widely believed to present for a united Papua 
New Guinea, and using existing administrative 
arrangements as the infrastructure for the 
new, decentralized arrangements (Papua New 
Guinea 1974: Part 1, Chapter 10). 
Thus does an arrangement agreed as part 
of package of measures to transform violent 
into political conflict cast light on the origins 
– and raise interesting new questions about the 
future – of the provincial government system 
and other aspects of decentralization in Papua 
New Guinea, and the role that governmental 
arrangements can play in promoting good 
governance and peace.
Author note
Professor Edward P. Wolfers is Adviser, 
Bougainville Peace and Restoration Office and 
Professor of Politics, University of Wollongong, 
Australia.
endnotes
1   This paper was presented to a seminar at the National 
Research Institute on 22 June 2006. The views 
expressed in the paper are personal (and sometimes 
speculative). They do not necessarily represent 
official positions.
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